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False memories happen when someone mis-remembers a past event that occurred. The study of 
false memories is commonly done using the DRM paradigm which can form false memories 
through semantic list learning. The current study is evaluating false memory, deception, and 
truth-telling using the DRM paradigm while measuring cortical activation with fNIRS. Results 
indicated no interactions between specific condition responses and brain regions in the prefrontal 
cortex. A main effect of condition was found indicating that correct responses have the lowest 
level of activation. Additionally, there were no significant differences found between deception 
and false memory responses. Further research needs to be conducted to help further analyze 
possible differences between these conditions as well as in more subcortical regions of the 
prefrontal cortex.  
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Evaluating False Memory, Deception, and Truth-Telling using fNIRS 
 As brain imaging has become more advanced and accessible in research various topics of 
interests have integrated this form of measurement into different research areas. Psychology and 
neuroimaging have become quite interlinked resulting in the field of cognitive neuroscience 
(Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1992). The study of false memory is still fairly new in 
psychology, it is the hope that integrating neuroimaging into studies of false memory that a better 
understanding of how false remembering works can be obtained.  
False Memory 
False memory gained interest in the field of psychology in the late 20th century when 
children who were in therapy began to recall abuse they previously had not been aware of 
(Loftus, 1993). While some allegations were true, many instances were cases of false memory 
where the children were recalling events that had never occurred. This created a need to 
understand why these false memories were happening and led to a large increase in the research 
of false memory. One of the earliest known studies about false memory was Bartlett’s 1932 study 
using the story known as “The War of the Ghosts”. Bartlett claimed to have found that the story 
became more and more misconstrued as the participants had to repeatedly retell the story. While 
these results have not been able to be replicated with this specific story, his research did help to 
distinguish between reproductive and reconstructive memory. Reproductive memory is defined 
as accurate production of material from memory (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Reconstructive 
memory on the other hand is more likely to have errors as people fill in missing information as 
information is recalled (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
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These two concepts of memory have led to many different theories that explain false 
memory including the spreading activation theory (Anderson, 1983; Roediger III, Balota, & 
Watson, 2001)of memory fuzzy-trace theory (FTT). Anderson (1983) created the framework for 
Activation Monitoring theory of factual memory. In this theory information is placed into 
cognitive units. These units are affected by practicing effects as well as delays in recall. When an 
individual attempts to retrieve information from memory the cognitive units, which form a large 
network with other units, are activated to retrieve the needed information. According to this 
theory, the retrieval occurs through spreading across this network with higher levels of network 
activation indicating better recall (Anderson, 1983).  
Transitivity development was what sparked the thinking behind FTT. Reyna and Brainerd 
(1990) used FTT as an alternative theory to both the information-processing theory and the 
Piagetian concept of retrieval. This theory works on a fuzzy-to-verbatim continuum of memory 
where individuals remember information using multiple representations of the information 
during encoding. Some of these representations can be verbatim, clear and specific memory 
traces, (like remembering the exact numbers given in a sequence) but are typically more difficult 
to retrieve while others are remembered more in a gist (that is, fuzzy memory trace) format (like 
remembering the general idea of a speech that was given rather than a word-for-word recount of 
what was said) (Reyna & Brainerd, 1990). It is this gist aspect of FTT that is used to explain the 
phenomenon of false memory. Having a global idea of a construct can cause false memories that 
are associated with the previously encoded information.  
The DRM Paradigm 
While there has been extensive research into false memory in recent years, the Deese-
Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm is the most frequently used research set up. An example 
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of a DRM list is: hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat, weather, freeze, air, shiver, 
Artic, frost with the critical lure word being cold. The phrase “critical lure” refers to the word 
that is supposed to come to mind as a false memory, as it is not on the original list but is 
associated with the words in the original list. In a meta-analysis study, researchers evaluated all 
false memory studies from 1994 to 2004 (N = 198) and found that DRM paradigms made up 
41% of all false memory research (Pezdek & Lam, 2007). The DRM paradigm stems from 
research by Deese (1959) which was largely ignored for several decades (as cited in Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). Deese wanted to test memory using free recall of word lists to see if he could 
elicit false memories from the participants. While his research for the most part was exploratory, 
he found interesting results showing that certain word lists were more inclined to produce false 
memories occur than others; the example above with the critical lure cold is an instance of one of 
these lists.  
This is where Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) hallmark study comes into play. They 
first replicated Deese’s original findings, illustrating that false memories in free recall occurred 
more than 50% of the time across participants with a fairly high confidence level. Once they 
established that Deese’s findings could be replicated, they then created a set of fifteen-word lists 
each containing a total of fifteen words along with a single critical lure word. Using these lists 
the researchers were again able to show a high level of false recall of the critical items. Since this 
study many researchers have replicated Roediger and McDermott’s findings. However other 
researchers soon began to look into the saliency of these word lists and began to study 
identifiability of the critical lures (Neuschatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003).  
Identifiability refers to how easily a person can detect the critical lure. A list with high 
identifiability would be one that takes little effort to figure out what the intended lure word is, 
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while a list with low identifiability would not typically be assumed by the participants. An 
example of a high identifiability list is: door, glass, pane, shade, ledge, sill, house, open, curtain, 
frame, view, breeze, sash, screen, shutter with the critical lure being the word window. An 
example of a low identifiability list is queen, England, crown, prince, George, dictator, palace, 
throne, chess, rule, subjects, monarch, royal, leader, reign with the critical lure being the word 
king. Both of these example lists were tested for their identifiability in a single study, researchers 
found the high identifiability list elicited false memory 65% of the time while the low 
identifiability list had only a 10% rate of false memory (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999).  
The study of identifiability with DRM lists has addressed two key research areas. In the 
first area, researchers evaluate the differences in false recognition across different levels of 
identifiability. Neuschatz, et al. (2003) evaluated false memories in a two by three design where 
participants were either warned or not warned about critical lures. There were further groups 
based on identifiability of the critical lure with there being a low condition, a high condition, and 
a condition where the participants were explicitly presented with the critical lure. The researchers 
found indications in the results that there was a reduction in false memories if the participants 
were in the high identifiability condition and were warned about the lure. However, participants 
who were in the low identifiability condition did not have a difference in false memories that was 
statistically significant between the no warning and warning condition. This showed that there 
was an interaction between level of identifiability and false memory rates. 
In the second area investigators evaluate how warnings about the critical lure affects false 
recognition across different levels of identifiability. Gallo, Roberts, and Seamon (1997) warned 
participants to be aware of any possible false alarms or were explicitly warned about actual false 
memory lure. Those who were explicitly warned about false memory did have a reduction in 
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false recognition, but it did not eliminate the effect indicating that awareness about the possibility 
of false memory does not completely inhibit creating a false memory. It is also important to note 
that there is a key difference in the effect of a warning depending on when the warning was 
given. This concept was explored by McCabe and Smith (2002) in a two-part study evaluating 
critical lure warnings in younger and older adults. In the first experiment, they found that both 
older and younger adults were able to reduce false memories when given the warning prior to 
studying the word list. This effect was not seen if the warnings were given after the lists were 
learned, but only before recall. A reason for this difference revolved around participants being 
able to try and guess what the critical lure items were when they were warned prior to studying 
the list and this allowed them to prevent more false memories during recall. In the second 
experiment, which was the same as the first except this time they were evaluating recognition 
rather than recall; both the younger and older adults were again able to benefit from being given 
the warning prior to the study phase. Younger adults who received the warning after the study 
phase but before recognition did have a reduction in the total number of false memories.  
In another interesting study, researchers evaluated false memory and identifiability in 
terms of time (Carneiro, Fernandez, Diez, Garicia-Marques, Ramos, & Ferreira, 2012). 
Researchers placed participants into two different time conditions. The first condition was self-
paced where participants had as much time as they wanted to answer yes or no in a word 
recognition task. The second condition the participants were told to give an immediate response 
after an acoustic sound was played. In this condition the sound was played 250 ms after the 
visual representation of each recognition word and the participants then had 500 ms to give their 
answer. When evaluating the results researcher found that in the timed condition there were more 
false memories in the high identifiability group. They postulated that this was likely do to the 
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participants not having time to fully process what word might come to mind versus what words 
were actually presented. 
Identifiability was evaluated for both free recall and recognition in a study by Stadler et 
al. (1999). In the study, the researchers evaluated the original 24 lists tested in the 1995 DRM 
study. An additional twelve lists were created by McDermott for this particular study. These lists 
were patterned after the original DRM study by Roediger and McDermott (1995) and allowed 
the researchers to evaluate both old and new lists simultaneously. Lists were analyzed by the 
researchers and split into two groups of eighteen. The top eighteen lists were considered to have 
a high level of false memory of the critical lure while the bottom eighteen had lower levels of 
false memory. For free recall the top eighteen lists had a critical lure recall mean of 51%, 
indicating a false memory occurred about half of the time. The bottom eighteen lists for free 
recall had a mean of 29%. For word recognition, the top eighteen lists the rate of recognition for 
the critical lure had a mean score of 77%. The bottom eighteen lists had a word recognition mean 
of 55%. The norms that the researchers found in this study allow researchers to choose lists that 
have been empirically shown to either have high or low levels of false memory of the critical 
lure. Overall, the DRM paradigm has been empirically supported across many different studies in 
regards to evaluating false memory.  
In order to better understand the cortical changes associated with these false memories, 
brain imaging technology is needed. Past researchers have utilized fMRI imaging when 
evaluating the DRM paradigm.  For instance, Dennis, Kim and Cabeza (2007) implemented the 
DRM paradigm in order to compare differences in the prevalence of false memories between 
younger and older adults. By including brain imaging, the researchers not only measured the 
difference in response rates but also found certain areas of the brain such as the medial temporal 
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lobes had reduced activity when recalling memories in the older adults in comparison to the 
younger adults. Moritz, Gläscher, Sommer, Büchel, & Braus (2006) utilized brain imaging in 
analyzing confidence levels of false and true memories with the DRM paradigm. Brain imaging 
allowed the researchers to find that confidence was associated with higher levels of activation of 
the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex and the medical temporal areas. Conversely, doubt 
was found to be associated with activation in the superior posterior parietal cortex.  As these 
studies illustrate, brain imaging works to help not only demonstrate the occurrence of false 
memories but allows researchers to look further into how brain activation changes across 
different conditions. In the current study, brain imaging was employed to help distinguish areas 
of brain activation across true memories, false memories, and deception. According to Abe and 
colleagues (2008) there are two forms of deception, pretending to know and pretending not to 
know. For the purpose of this study deception will be thought of as an intention pretending not to 
know.  
fNIRS 
Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a type of neuroimaging that allows 
researchers to evaluate levels of hemoglobin in the blood to measure oxygenation changes in 
different cortical areas of the brain (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012). Light emitting diodes (LEDs) 
are able to detect the changes in hemoglobin levels and these changes allow researchers to 
determine which parts of the brain are being activated as blood is directed towards the parts of 
the brain that are in use. A hemodynamic response refers to the increased flow of oxygen and 
blood to the area of the brain that is being activated which is picked up by the infrared red light 
that is being transmitted from the fNIRS probes on the cap.  
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 The first application of NIR imaging was performed by Frans Jobsis (1977) who 
concluded that the NIR range of light allowed for real time non-invasive detection of hemoglobin 
oxygenation. As researchers continued to develop, investigators made NIR imaging more 
efficient allowing for fNIRS to emerge and allow researchers to simultaneously map different 
cortical areas of the brain (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012). The fNIRS technique has been approved 
by the FDA for diagnostic and research purposes and has been found to have no damaging 
effects (Murkin & Arango, 2009). It has also been shown to be a valid measure of cortical 
changes as fNIRS measurements have been repeatedly confirmed with fMRI imaging as well 
(Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012).  
Before evaluating studies that utilized fNIRS for deception, it is important to note that 
investigators have previously used fMRI to support differences in the neural correlates of false 
memory and deception (Abe et al., 2008). A distinction has also been established between truth 
and deception. Hu, Hong, and Ge (2012) found cortical differences between truth telling and 
deception, however the results of this study are limited because of a small sample size of eight 
participants (Hu, Hong, & Ge, 2012). However, the researchers’ results back the assumption that 
the prefrontal cortex is implicated in deception. They found hemodynamic responses to 
deception in the left border of the left prefrontal cortex as well as the right anterior prefrontal 
cortex.   
Tian, Kozel, and Liu (2009) implemented a procedure in which participants had to “steal” 
an item, either a watch or a ring, from a researcher. Participants were then given a questionnaire 
about either a watch and a ring. The questions revolved around the item being stolen and where 
the object was placed after it was stolen. Participants were instructed to answer all questions as if 
they had not stolen either item. For example, if the participants had “stolen” the watch, questions 
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about the ring would be true since participants did not steal a ring and the questions about the 
watch would be lies since the participants had in fact stolen the watch but were answering the 
questions as if they had not taken the watch. In a similar study, researchers utilized the same 
stealing procedure by having the participants steal a watch and then place it in a specific place. 
As was found by Hu, Hong, and Ge (2012), , researchers found activation in the left border of the 
left prefrontal cortex and the right anterior prefrontal cortex. 
Spontaneous deception has also been evaluated by investigators using fNIRS. (Ding, 
Gao, Fu, & Lee, 2013). In this study the researchers created a game that was impossible to win 
without the participants at some point having to lie. In this game participants had to guess what 
side of a screen a coin would appear on. They made their prediction by gesturing with their 
corresponding hand under the desk what side they predicted the coin would be on. Once the coin 
appeared on the screen participants indicated if their prediction was correct. They would gain 
points for correct predictions and loose points for incorrect predictions. In order to complete the 
game, the participant had to reach a certain number of points that would be nearly impossible to 
reach using only pure guessing. This forced participants to lie about their predictions in order to 
complete the game successfully. The lies were recorded using a hidden camera under the table 
that revealed which hand the participants were using to make their predictions. This allowed the 
researchers to evaluate deceptions that the participants freely and spontaneously made rather than 
being explicitly told by the researcher to lie. Again, the researchers found that spontaneous 
deceptions had similar levels of activation in the same areas of the prefrontal cortex as when 
participants were given instructed deceptions. These results aid in further solidifying the 
conclusion that the prefrontal cortex can be measured with fNIRS and is likely to be involved 
with all types of deception. 
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Goal of the Present Study 
The main goal of this study is to build on the evaluation of cortical responses in a DRM 
false memory paradigm. Specifically, investigators have evaluated the differences between (1) 
false memory and deception, as well as (2) deception and truth, however there does not appear to 
be any literature that evaluates all three components in a single study. This experiment will then 
offer within-participant insight that has not been previously examined.  
Method 
The sample was 33 participants who participated in extra credit through SONA Systems. 
There were 28 female participants and 5 male participants. The average age was 21.79 with a 
standard deviation of 4.46. Handedness was assessed as individuals who are left handed can have 
difference in cortical activity compared to those who are right handed. A majority of the 
participants were right handed (n=30) the remaining participants reported either being left 
handed (n=1) or ambidextrous (n=2). The majority of the participants were white (n=19).  
Participants were brought into the NIRS lab and given an informed consent form. After 
reading and signing the consent form , participants were equipped with the fNIRS cap and the 
cables were connected. They were placed in front of a computer screen and administered the 
DRM lists using Inquisit, a coding program designed to administer various neuropsychological 
assessments. The Inquisit software connects to the NIRS SCOUT which is a computer device 
used to quantify the oxygen concentration changes in the blood that are detected by the fNIRS. 
When these two tools are used together researchers are able to track what stimulus the participant 
was being subjected to when there were cortical changes in blood flow. For example, during an 
old-new recognition memory test, these devices will code for a false memory and record all 
cortical activation following these false memories.    
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All the DRM lists were played verbally through the Inquisit program, with each word 
being presented once with a one second delay between each word. Participants first heard eight 
DRM lists, each containing fifteen words presented in the standard manner in descending order 
of association to the non-presented critical lure.  An example of this would be the following list: 
mad, fear, hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, fight, hatred, mean, calm, emotion, enrage 
with the critical lure being anger. After all eight lists were presented, the participants performed 
a recognition task where they were asked if a test item was an old word (i.e., presented on the 
previous lists) or a new word (i.e., has not been seen previously). Participants made their 
selection using the laptop keyboard. The recognition task included words from the list, the 
critical lure word, as well as words that are novel that have low association with the word lists 
that were given.  
Participants then rated their confidence of each of their old/new choices. The 100-point 
confidence scale was presented in increments of five and ranges from not at all confidence (0) to 
very confident (100). All DRM lists had high identifiability as these are the most likely to trigger 
a false memory. The lists that were utilized came from a study by Stadler, Roediger, and 
McDermott (1999) that evaluated 36 lists for their level of identifiability. Since the present study 
included a recognition task, the lists were chosen from the 18 lists found by the researchers to 
have the highest level of false recognition. It is useful for the study to have as many false 
memories as possible for comparison against truth-telling and deception. To determine if 
identifiability was similar across phases of the study, the backwards association strength (BAS) 
of the word lists was evaluated using normed mean BAS scores from Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, and Gallo (2001). BAS scores were compared across phase 1 studied word lists, 
phase 2 studied word lists, and novel non-studied word lists. Each of these conditions had eight 
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words lists used that all had been evaluated in the above-mentioned study. The average BAS 
scores were as follows: phase 1 studied words BAS=.216, phase 2 studied words BAS=.167, and 
novel non-studied words BAS=.178. Overall, these averages appear to be fairly consistent across 
these three conditions indicating that these lists overall have a similar level of free recall 
association between the critical lure words and the words presented in the lists.  
After these eight lists were completed, participants were told the purpose of the DRM list 
task. In this second phase of the experiment, they were then instructed that they would be given 
eight lists and before each list they would be told the critical lure word. As opposed to the 
previous part of the study, participants were given the recognition task after each list for a total of 
eight times. Participants were told to choose the critical lure as an old word during the 
recognition phase, despite them knowing it was not on the list. 
Once the participant completed these eight lists, there was a critical thinking task. 
Participants read a brief excerpt from a 2014 SAT practice test and then answered several 
multiple-choice questions relating to the text. The purpose of the critical thinking task is to gain 
cortical feedback to compare to the intentional deceptions. Since both critical thinking and 
deception utilize the prefrontal cortex this task was being implemented to make distinctions in 
that area of the brain. Following the critical thinking task, participants answered a brief 
demographic questionnaire and completed an 18 question Need for Cognition scale. According 
to Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984) need for cognition refers to an individual’s enjoyment in 
completing effortful cognitive endeavors. Need for cognition was evaluated as past research has 
shown that individuals who have a higher need for cognition tend to actually commit more false 
memories than individuals with a lower need for cognition (Graham, 2007). Once the 
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demographics questionnaire was finished, the study was completed. At this point the researcher 
removed the fNIRS cap as well as debriefed the participant. 
 After data collection was completed, the data was preprocessed using NIR Star software. 
Here, event markers were labeled with the corresponding conditions (i.e. correct studied words / 
false memory). Additionally, the data were truncated with any data, collected 20 seconds prior to 
the first event trigger and after the final trigger were excluded. Data quality was checked using a 
CV (coefficient of variance) filter that did not exceed 15%. Based on this setting, any channels 
exceeding this threshold were considered bad channels and excluded for that participant. Finally, 
after all of these processes were completed, the data were filtered using a Band pass filter to 
adjust the data for any signaling issues. Once the data were filtered and preprocessing was 
completed, hemodynamic states were calculated. Using the Beer-Lambert Law parameters from 
W.B. Gratzer, differential pathlength factors for wavelength 1 and wavelength 2 were determined 
based on the participant’s age. Once the parameters were set, the hemodynamic responses were 
calculated. Next, the data were extracted from NIRS Star using the block averaging function. 
Here the data were extracted into a text file across all conditions. For each condition, data were 
collected for five seconds after each instance of an event trigger. Baseline was set as one second 
preceding each trigger. Only data for the oxygenated hemoglobin were extracted across all 
conditions studied. Once the data were exported, the text files were imported into Excel where 
the data were cleaned, and calculations of the waveforms were made. The final data analysis was 
performed in SPSS. 
Results 
Analyses were conducted to compare the minimum value, maximum value, average of 
the minimum and maximum values, and amplitude of the waveform form from the instance of 
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the trigger to five seconds afterwards of oxygenated hemoglobin levels across ten regions of the 
brain and five conditions (see Figure 1). The following conditions were the main focus of the 
analyses: correct responses for studied words (participant responded that a word was ‘old’ and it 
was heard during the encoding phase), correct responses for non-studied words (participant 
responded that the word was ‘new’ and it had not been heard during encoding phase), false 
memories (during phase 1 participant stated that the critical lure was ‘old’), deception (during 
phase 2 participant stated the critical lure was ‘old’ after being instructed to do so), and critical 
thinking task (participant responded to a multiple choice questionnaire following a reading 
passage). There were five brain regions assessed in both the left and right hemisphere: the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (VLPFC), inferior temporal cortex, and premotor cortex.  
 
Figure 1. Example of hemodynamic response function. Adapted from “Translating the 
hemodynamic response: Why focused interdisciplinary integration should matter for the future of 
functional neuroimaging” by S. Cinciute, 2019, PeerJ, 7. 
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Repeated Measures ANOVA – All Brain Regions 
 The repeated measures ANOVA was conducted a sample size of 23 with 10 participants 
being excluded. Ten participants were excluded because repeated measures ANOVA excludes 
data in a pairwise fashion meaning if there is any missing data for a participant, the participant is 
excluded. These ten participants had missing data because of weak signals during data collection. 
Because of this, additional analyses were run only looking at the VLPFC and DLPFC for both 
left and right hemisphere. These areas were considered regions of interest which brought the 
sample size up to 30 participants. Another analysis was done where all five regions of interest 
were combined and averaged across so activation was now considered in the left or right 
hemisphere. These analyses are discussed individually.  
Looking at the within-subject effects, condition and brain region showed significant 
differences across their levels for maximum value, minimum value, and amplitude of the 
oxygenated hemoglobin response. There were no significant oxygenated hemoglobin differences 
found for the average oxygenated hemoglobin levels. Additionally, there were no significant 
interactions between condition and brain region. These significance outcomes were interpreted 
using Greenhouse-Geisser correlation as Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant for 
condition maximum value (x2(9)=59.92, p<.001), condition minimum value (x2(9)=33.91, 
p<.001), condition amplitude (x2(9)=62.174, p<.001), brain region maximum value 
(x2(44)=107.75, p<.001), brain region minimum value (x2(44)=134.73, p<.001), and brain region 
amplitude (x2(44)=127.13, p<.001). 
For condition, effects were found for the maximum value F(2.06, 45.36) = 6.32, p=.003, 
ηp2=.223, minimum value F(2.52, 55.40)=7.05, p=.001, ηp2=.243, and amplitude F(2.56, 56.22) 
= 18.40 p<.001, , ηp2=.455. For brain region an effect was found for the maximum value F(3.98, 
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87.53) = 4.66, p=.002, , ηp2=.175, minimum value F(3.06, 67.41)=5.91, p=.001, ηp2=.212, and 
amplitude F(3.39, 74.61) = 11.71 p<.001, ηp2=.347.  
Bonferroni post hoc tests showed a significant difference between several conditions, 
some of which will be discussed. Looking at maximum peak, critical thinking had a significantly 
higher mean compared to correct studied (p=.013) and correct non-studied (p=.007). For the 
amplitude (Figure 1), correct studied had a significantly lower mean level of oxygenated 
hemoglobin when compared to false memory (p=.036), deception (p=.001), and critical thinking 
(p<.001). Correct non-studied was found to have significantly lower oxygenated hemoglobin 
levels when compared to deception (p=.001) and critical thinking (p<.001). For minimum value 
(Figure 2), correct studied had a significantly higher minimum value compared to deception 
(p=.041) and critical thinking (p=.001). Additionally, correct non-studied had the same pattern 
with oxygenated hemoglobin levels being significantly higher than deception (p=.036) and 
critical thinking (p=.002).  
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Figure 3. Oxygenated hemoglobin minimum across conditions 
Moving onto brain regions, Bonferroni post hoc tests again showed several significant 
differences. These differences however will not be discussed in depth. This is because changes in 
cortical activation across variation brain regions was expected and without an interaction 
occurring between brain region and condition these differences do not yield any further pertinent 
information.   
Repeated Measures – DLPFC and VLPFC Only  
Following this analysis, the same repeated measures analysis was performed focusing 
specifically on the left and right VLPFC and DLPFC. This analysis was done for two primary 
reasons. While these analyses were exploratory in nature, these regions in the prefrontal cortex 
were postulated to be more integral in the processes being measured. Therefore, regardless of the 
issues encountered with sampling, it is beneficial to look explicitly at these regions due to the 
nature of the cognitive processes being evaluated. Secondly this analysis helps to increase the 
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any missing data excluded a participant from the results. These four brain regions had less 
missing data which served to increase sample size.   
This analysis brought the sample size up from 23 to 30 (meaning three participants were 
still excluded). When looking at the within-subject effects, there again is no interaction between 
condition and brain region and the main effect for brain region is no longer present. This lost 
main effect may simply be due to the regions of interests being too similar to each other to have 
any difference. The main effect for condition was still found for maximum value F(1.96, 56.96) 
= 9.93, p<.001, ηp2=.255, minimum value F(2.21, 64.05) = 8.72, p<.001, ηp2=.231, and 
amplitude F(1.87, 54.36) = 17.70, p<.001, ηp2=.379. As before, these analyses were significant 
for Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity for condition maximum value (x2(9)=72.21, p<.001) condition 
minimum value (x2(9)=65.60, p<.001), and condition amplitude (x2(9)=88.67, p<.001)  meaning 
that results were interpreted using Greenhouse-Geisser.  
Results of the repeated measures ANOVA reported here are only highlighting results that 
were different from the previous analysis. All results for condition that were previously 
significant remained so in this analysis. There were however three new significant pairwise 
comparisons. For maximum value, false memories were higher than correct non-studied (p=.028) 
and lower than the mean for critical thinking (p=.037). For amplitude, again false memory was 
significantly higher than correct non-studied (p=.011). A final repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed to see if there were any distinctive differences between the left and right prefrontal 
cortex in general but these results again yielded only a main effect for condition and no 
interaction, because of this will not be discussed further. 
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Figure 4. Oxygenated hemoglobin amplitude across condition (only DLPFC and VLPFC) 
 
Figure 5. Oxygenated hemoglobin maximum value across conditions (DLPFC and VLPFC only) 
Need for Cognition  
Need for cognition was evaluated using a mid-point of zero with those having a positive 
score being high in need for cognition and those with a negative score being low in need for 
cognition. There were 26 participants who were considered high in need for cognition and 7 who 
were low in need for cognition. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to see if there were any 
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false memory conditions. Results showed those low in need for cognition (M=-.00039, 
SD=.00041,n=7) had significantly lower oxygenated hemoglobin levels than those high in need 
for cognition (M=-.00013, SD=.00014, n=24), F(1,31)=7.334, p=.011 in the LOFC for the 
minimum value during false memory. This result was not found for any other brain areas across 
any of the measurements used.  
Additionally, need for cognition was compared to confidence ratings, and reaction times 
of correct responses and false memories. Those with a high need for cognition (M=70.07, 
SD=11.51) scored significantly higher on average confidence than those with a low need for 
cognition (M=55.19, SD=12.66) F(1,31)=8.86, p=.006. There were no differences found in false 
memory rate, reaction time, or false memory confidence.  
Behavioral Factors  
Reaction time, confidence, and false memory rates were also evaluated and compared 
using Pearson’s correlation. All participants had at least one false memory. Additionally, the 
number of false memories (M=6.18, SD=1.84) was positively correlated with confidence 
(M=66.92, SD=13.11) r(31)=.494, p=.004. Number of false memories was also negatively related 
to false memory reaction time (M=7.58, SD=.77) meaning response for false memory critical 
lures was faster the more false memories a participant had r(31)=-.394, p=.023. This however 
was not seen for the correct response reaction time. 
Discussion 
 The results of this study showed there were no significant interactions between condition 
and brain region and across all analyses performed, condition yielded a main effect. Lack of 
interactions could be due to the sample size of this study and the brain regions of interest. First, 
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there were ten participants who had missing data caused by bad signals during data collection. 
This means the signal from the fNIRS probes did not have a high enough signal-to-noise ratio to 
produce useable data. Excluding ten participants greatly impacted overall participant size and 
may have negated possible interactions. .  
 When looking across all ten brain regions, focusing on DLPFC and VLPDC, and when 
looking at left versus right hemispheres, condition remained a main effect. This indicates that 
different conditions impact the level of oxygenated hemoglobin. This is further supported by the 
weaker or non-presented main effect of brain region indicating that the activation may be spread 
across the prefrontal cortex in a way that is not meaningful or distinguishable using fNIRS 
imaging.  
The lack of distinction between the left and right hemisphere is interesting especially 
when evaluating deception. Past research has shown that deception has been linked to higher 
activation in the left prefrontal cortex (Hu, Hong, & Ge, 2012; Tian, Sharma, Kozel, & Liu, 
2009). A possible explanation for this discrepancy is due to the type of deception. In both of the 
previous studies deception was naturally produced, meaning that the experimental design 
allowed for the participants to choose to lie on their own. However, in the current study the 
deception was elicited through instruction. While these would still be considered lies overall, 
there may be less of a cognitive load during an elicited lie compared to a lie that is produced 
naturally.   
 Evaluating differences across conditions, there were several findings that are highlighted 
here. First, contrary to what was predicted there were no significant differences found between 
the false memory and deception conditions. This may indicate that a false memory and a lie are 
cortically similar in processing making it difficult to distinguish between the two. This point is 
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also interesting as separately both deception and false memory were found to have higher levels 
of activation compared to correct responses that were made. This could show that while 
deception and false memory are difficult to separate, there is a distinct difference between both 
of these processes and a correct response. This finding is contrary to other research studies. For 
example, one study implemented a similar list recognition task and required participants to lie in 
one condition and make a truthful attempt in the other. This study found that there was far less 
activation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex during a false memory compared to the 
deception. This finding conflicts with the similar levels that were found in the current study and 
also is surprising when the VLPFC was one of the two targeted brain regions involved in 
additional analyses. However, it should be noted the other study utilized fMRI imaging as 
opposed to fNIRS and was conducted on a sample of only ten participants.  
Another interesting facet of this study was the critical thinking component. There were 
findings that indicated critical thinking required more activation compared to correct responses, 
and when evaluating maximum values critical thinking had a significantly higher maximum 
value compared to false memory. These findings suggest that critical thinking requires more use 
of the prefrontal cortex compared to false memories as well as correct answers. Additionally, 
while these differences did not reach significance across the other measures, there appears to be a 
trend towards critical thinking producing more activation than deception as well.  
 Despite past research showing those high in need for cognition tend to have more false 
memories (Graham, 2007; Leding, 2011), this study did not find such a difference. However, the 
current sample had few participants who were low in need for cognition, which could explain 
these results. Additionally, only one brain region appeared to have difference levels of activation 
for those with low and high need for cognition, leading to the conclusion this difference is likely 
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due to chance as opposed to an indicator of differential use of brain region. However, increasing 
sample size would be important to help establish if this finding could have importance in the 
processes being evaluated. Those high in need for cognition did however have more overall 
confidence in their ratings regardless of the amount of false memories (Kuvaas & Kaufmann, 
2004).  
 There was a positive relationship between number of false memories and confidence 
meaning those who had more false memories were more confidence in their responses and 
responded quicker to critical lures compared to those with less false memories. The quicker 
reaction time relationship with false memories could be indicative of these participants relying 
more heavily on their gist trace memories while those who have less false memories taking more 
time and using verbatim memory instead. This is an important concept as in forensic psychology 
literature there has been a push to distinguish accuracy from confidence (Busey, Tunnicliff, 
Loftus, & Loftus, (2000); Chua, Rand-Giovannetti, Schacter, Albert, & Sperling (2004); 
Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Often in the legal setting jurors make the assumption that a person who 
is confident in their testimony must be correct. This is not the case, many studies have shown 
that there is little to no correlation between these constructs, a premise that is mirrored in this 
study (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). 
 It should be noted, despite some of these results potentially impaired by a small sample 
size, that a great deal of time and effort went into the data collection process. In addition to 
making a novel DRM code that worked with the NIRS machinery available, each participant ran 
took between an hour and ninety minutes. With each participant requiring a good deal of set up 
that sometimes malfunctioned resulting in a loss of time and a participant that cannot be run. 
Beyond these efforts, there are many points prior to data collect that can cause a loss of time and 
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a large amount of effort. Calibrating each participant can result in multiple attempts to achieve a 
strong signal result in a more arduous set up and data collection period.  
Limitations 
 There are two main limitations to this study, one being a major coding error during initial 
data collection and the other the result of this error, a small sample size. In order to create a 
DRM paradigm task that can be conducted by computer and recorded with NIRS equipment, a 
complex code was created with unique event markers triggers that would indicate different time 
points when participants had made old and new choices. Initial data collection occurred over the 
span of a semester resulting in 49 participants being collected. However, the event markers for 
the second phase of the experiment were coded improperly resulting in these event markers 
being absent in initial data preprocessing. Because of this, data collected on these 49 participants 
had to be disregarded as attempting to recreate the 52 missing triggers for each participant would 
have been too time consuming and possibly imprecise. After this discovery, the code was fixed 
so that all triggers were properly coded. Participant data collection was started once again but 
due to time constraints only 33 participants were tested. While smaller sample sizes are often 
expected in imaging studies, this error reduced the sample size which could have resulted in 
effects and interactions between condition and brain region being too small to yield significance   
Future Directions 
 Future directions should include three main areas of focus. First, different types of 
imaging should be used in attempting to better discern which areas of the brain may be 
associated with the three concepts under investigation in the present experiment. There is strong 
evidence of the importance of the anterior cingulate cortex in deception, but this area cannot be 
evaluated with fNIRS because it is too sub-cortical. Integrating different imaging techniques 
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would allow for a more robust understanding of the processes that are occurring in the brain 
throughout truth-telling, deception, and false memories.  
 Secondly, attention tasks should be implemented to ensure that participants are attending 
throughout the experiment. In this study this is because with fNIRS participants must sit in a 
room devoid of light except for the computer screen, participants can often become drowsy or 
easily distracted. Incorporating an attentional task in future research would help to ensure 
accurate participant responses.  
 Finally, expanding this research by utilizing word lists that have different levels of 
identifiability in the DRM paradigm is recommended. Thanks to the research of Stadler, 
Roediger, and McDermott, (1999) identifiability of DRM lists has been established. The use of 
highly identifiable lists was necessary to achieve enough false memory results to be analyzed, 
however it would be interesting to evaluate how false memories may or may not be processed 
differently based on lists varying on high, medium, or low identifiability, as well as on the 
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Appendix A 
Phase 1 Study Task 
Instructions:  
Welcome to this study! This study has three phases. In the first phase, you will hear 8 lists of 15 
words each. Listen to the words carefully. After all lists have been presented your memory for 
the words will be tested. The words will be spoken one after the other. Pay close attention, 
because the words will be presented at a moderate pace. 
 




































































































































Note: Bolded words are the critical lure words 
Lists are from:  
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not 
presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
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Appendix B 
Phase 1 Recognition Task 
Instructions: 
This concludes the study phase. Now we will test your memory for the words that you studied. 
You will see a series of words one at a time. Press the "z" key (without Shift) when it is a word 
that you studied (i.e., an "old" word). Press the "/" key (without Shift) when it is a word that you 
did not study (i.e., a "new" word). After each selection there will be a brief pause with a blank 
white screen to capture brain functioning. Following this pause, we want you to rate how 
confident you felt in determining if these words were old or new. Using the left and right arrow 
keys; for each word select your confidence level from “not at all confident” to “very confident” 
and then press ENTER. Be sure to change the scale for each word to reflect your confidence for 
every decision. 
 
Sample of Old/New Choice Selection 
 
 
Words Presented during Recognition Task  
Critical Lures Studied Words Non-Studied Words 
Anger Mad Shoe 
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Appendix C 
Phase 2 Study Task 
Instructions: 
We will now be moving on to phase two of the study. In this section you will go through the 
same process as in phase one except for one major change. The previous phase was evaluating 
false memory using what is known as the DRM paradigm. The lists you saw each had a semantic 
theme and included one word that was related to this theme but not shown, the critical lure. It is 
common when deciding if the words are old or new for participants to pick this critical lure word 
as old despite it not being presented. For example, you may see a sequence of words such as 
“Rest, Bed, Nap, Peace, Drowsy, Blanket” all of which are associated with the word SLEEP. 
Participants will often report SLEEP as an old. In this phase of the study we will be telling you 
what the critical lure is for each list. After every list you will perform the memory task and when 
the critical lure is shown *** you will intentionally select that the critical lure is old *** despite 
being aware that it is new. The intention of this is to elicit a deception that can be compared to 
the previous false memories.  
 




































































































































Note: Bolded words are the critical lure words 
Lists are from:  
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not 
presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
21(4), 803–814. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.21.4.803 
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Appendix D 
Phase 2 Recognition Task Words By List 
Cold Word List 








Cup Word List 








High Word List 








Trash Word List 








Rough Word List 
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Sweet Word List 








Window Word List 








Smoke Word List 
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Appendix E 




































































































































Note: Bolded words are the critical lure words 
Lists are from:  
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not 
presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
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Appendix F 
Need for Cognition Scale 
Instructions:  
You will now be presented a series of questions; using the mouse rank each question depending 
on how much you agree or disagree with the statement. Following these questions you will be 
asked to fill out a brief demographics questionnaire. 
Questions: 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities.* 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think 
in depth about something.* 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.* 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.* 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.* 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.* 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort.* 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.* 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
* Reverse scoring is used on this item 
Likert scale from -4 to +4  
+4 = very strong agreement, +3 = strong agreement, +2 = moderate agreement, +1 = slight 
agreement,     0 = neither agreement or disagreement, -1 = slight disagreement, -2 = moderate 
disagreement,                   -3 = strong disagreement, -4 = very strong disagreement  
Reference: 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Feng Kao, C. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for 
cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. 
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Appendix G 
Critical Thinking Task 
Instructions: 
This concludes phase 2 of the study. The final portion of this study will be done to measure 
critical thinking. You will read a brief passage and then answer some multiple choice questions 
about the reading. Please read through the passage carefully and answer all of the questions to 
the best of your ability. This portion of the experiment does not have a time limit. 
 
Reading Passage  
 
 
FALSE MEMORY, DECEPTION, AND TRUTH-TELLING USING FNIRS 39 
 















• Which Hand do you consider your dominant hand? 
o Left 
o Right 
o I use both equally 







o African American or Black 
o Hispanic 
o Asian 
o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
o Other 
FALSE MEMORY, DECEPTION, AND TRUTH-TELLING USING FNIRS 41 
 
References 
Abe, N., Okuda, J., Suzuki, M., Sasaki, H., Matsuda, T., Mori, E., … Fujii, T. (2008). Neural 
correlates of true memory, false memory, and deception. Cerebral Cortex, 18(12), 2811–
2819. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhn037 
Anderson, J. R. (1983). A spreading activation theory of memory. Readings in Cognitive Science: 
A Perspective from Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-1-
4832-1446-7.50016-9 
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: An experimental and social study. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University. 
Busey, T. A., Tunnicliff, J., Loftus, G. R., & Loftus, E. F. (2000). Accounts of the confidence-
accuracy relation in recognition memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7(1), 26-48. 
Carneiro, P., Fernandez, A., Diez, E., Garcia-Marques, L., Ramos, T., & Ferreira, M. B. (2012). 
“Identify-to-reject”: A specific strategy to avoid false memories in the DRM paradigm. 
Memory & Cognition, 40(2), 252–265. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-011-0152-6 
Chua, E. F., Rand-Giovannetti, E., Schacter, D. L., Albert, M. S., & Sperling, R. A. (2004). 
Dissociating confidence and accuracy: Functional magnetic resonance imaging shows 
origins of the subjective memory experience. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 16(7), 
1131-1142. 
Cinciute S. 2019. Translating the hemodynamic response: why focused interdisciplinary 
integration should matter for the future of functional neuroimaging. PeerJ 7:e6621 
https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.6621 
FALSE MEMORY, DECEPTION, AND TRUTH-TELLING USING FNIRS 42 
 
Dennis, N. A., Kim, H., & Cabeza, R. (2007). Effects of aging on true and false memory 
formation: An fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 45(14), 3157–3166. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.07.003 
Ding, X. P., Gao, X., Fu, G., & Lee, K. (2013). Neural correlates of spontaneous deception: A 
functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)study. Neuropsychologia, 51(4), 704–712. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.12.018 
Ferrari, M., & Quaresima, V. (2012). A brief review on the history of human functional near-
infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) development and fields of application. NeuroImage, 63(2), 
921–935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.049 
Graham, L. M. (2007). Need for cognition and false memory in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
paradigm. Personality and Individual Differences, 42(3), 409–418. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.07.012 
Hu, X.-S., Hong, K.-S., & Ge, S. S. (2012). fNIRS-based online deception decoding. Journal of 
Neural Engineering, 9(2), 26012. https://doi.org/10.1088/1741-2560/9/2/026012 
Kuvaas, B., & Kaufmann, G. (2004). Impact of mood, framing, and need for cognition on 
decision makers' recall and confidence. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17(1), 59-
74. 
Leding, J. K. (2011). Need for cognition and false recall. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 51(1), 68-72.Loftus, E. (1993). The reality of repressed memories. American 
Psychologist, 48(5), 518–537. https://doi.org/10.1300/J229v03n01_03 
FALSE MEMORY, DECEPTION, AND TRUTH-TELLING USING FNIRS 43 
 
McCabe, D. P., & Smith, A. D. (2002). The effect of warnings on false memories in young and 
older adults. Memory and Cognition, 30(7), 1065–1077. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03194324 
Moritz, S., Gläscher, J., Sommer, T., Büchel, C., & Braus, D. F. (2006). Neural correlates of 
memory confidence. NeuroImage, 33(4), 1188–1193. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.08.003 
Murkin, J. M., & Arango, M. (2009). Near-infrared spectroscopy as an index of brain and tissue 
oxygenation. British Journal of Anaesthesia, 103(SUPPL.1), 3–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bja/aep299 
Neuschatz, J. S., Benoit, G. E., & Payne, D. G. (2003). Effective warnings in the Deese-
Roediger-McDermott false-memory paradigm: The role of identifiability. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29(1), 35–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.29.1.35 
Pezdek, K., & Lam, S. (2007). What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to 
study “false memory,” and what are the implications of these choices? Consciousness and 
Cognition, 16(1), 2–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.06.006 
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1990). Fuzzy processing in transitivity development. Annals of 
Operations Research, 23, 37–63. 
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not 
presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
21(4), 803–814. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.21.4.803 
FALSE MEMORY, DECEPTION, AND TRUTH-TELLING USING FNIRS 44 
 
Roediger, H. L., Watson, J. M., McDermott, K. B., & Gallo, D. A. (2001). Factors that determine 
false recall: A multiple regression analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(3), 385-407. 
Sporer, S. L., Penrod, S., Read, D., & Cutler, B. (1995). Choosing, confidence, and accuracy: A 
meta-analysis of the confidence-accuracy relation in eyewitness identification 
studies. Psychological Bulletin, 118(3), 315. 
Stadler, M. a, Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1999). Norms for word lists that create false 
memories. Memory & Cognition, 27(3), 494–500. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03211543 
Storbeck, J., & Clore, G. L. (2005). With sadness comes accuracy; with happiness, false 
memory: Mood and the false memory effect. Psychological Science, 16(10), 785-791. 
Tian, F., Sharma, V., Kozel, F. A., & Liu, H. (2009). Functional near-infrared spectroscopy to 
investigate hemodynamic responses to deception in the prefrontal cortex. Brain Research, 
1303, 120–130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2009.09.085 
 
